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Abstract
Water is scarce in many countries. One instrument for improving the allocation of a scarce resource is (efficient)
pricing or taxation. However, water is implicitly traded on international markets, particularly through food and
textiles, so that the impacts of water taxes cannot be studied in isolation, but require an analysis of international
trade implications. We include water as a production factor in a multi-region, multi-sector computable general
equilibrium model (GTAP), to assess a series of water tax policies. We find that water taxes reduce water use and
lead to shifts in production, consumption and international trade patterns. Countries that do not levy water taxes are
nonetheless affected by other countries’ taxes. Taxes on agricultural water use drive most of the economic and
welfare impacts. Reductions in water use (welfare losses) are less (more) than linear with the price of water. The
results are sensitive to the assumed ability to substitute other production factors for water. A water tax on
production would have different effects on water use, production and trade patterns and the size and distribution of
welfare losses than would a water tax on final consumption.
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1. Introduction
Water is one of our basic resources, but it is often in short supply. The total amount of fresh water
available would be sufficient to provide the present world population with a minimally required amount
of water. However, the uneven distribution of water and people between regions has made the adequate
supply critical for a growing number of countries (Seckler et al., 1998). Rapid population growth and
increasing consumption of water per capita has aggravated the problem. Water withdrawal for most uses
is projected to increase by at least 50% by 2025 compared to the 1995 level (Rosegrant et al., 2002). An
additional reason for concern is climate change. Climate change models predict that geographic
differences in rainfall are likely to become more pronounced with increased precipitation in high
latitudes and decreased rainfall elsewhere. Higher temperatures would imply larger water demand and
higher evaporation (IPCC, 2001).
As the supply of water is limited, attempts have been made to economize on the consumption of water,
especially in regions where the supply is critical. One way to address the problem is to reduce the
inefficiencies in irrigation and urban water systems in existing water uses. In urban water systems, water
is wasted through leakage. This is particularly pronounced for large cities in Africa, Asia, Latin America
and even in the water-scarce Middle East (Rosegrant et al., 2002). Yet, in 2000 about 70% of all water
was used for agriculture1. For some developing countries the average irrigation efficiency is far below
what is technically possible. The current level and structure of water charges mostly do not encourage
farmers to use water more efficiently. For countries that are not short of water there also seems to be
room for improvement (Seckler et al., 1998).
An increase in water price, for instance by a tax, would lead to the adoption of improved irrigation
technology (e.g. Dinar & Yaron, 1992). The water saved could be used in other sectors, for which the
value is much higher. In this paper, we will not consider reallocation of water, but instead look at a
reallocation of water-intensive products. National and international markets of agricultural products are
affected. A complete understanding of a water pricing policy is therefore impossible without
understanding the international markets for food and other agricultural products, such as textiles.
There is strong opposition to higher water prices, especially in water scarce regions. In many regions,
water use is even subsidized. This is partly because of the desired aim of food self-sufficiency (Ahmad,
2000). However, food demand could be met by importing more water-intensive food from water-
abundant countries and producing and exporting commodities that are less water intensive. The water
embedded in commodities is also known as virtual water (Allan, 1992, 1993). So far, few studies provide
estimates of the global virtual water trade (see e.g. Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004). Changes in water
prices would affect the virtual water trade. To our knowledge, this has not been investigated in a multi-
region, multi-sector general equilibrium model.
Rosegrant et al. (2002) and Fraiture et al. (2004) use partial equilibrium models. Our general
equilibrium approach allows for a richer set of economic feedbacks and for a complete assessment of the
welfare implications. The analysis is based on countries’ total renewable water resources and differences
in water productivity. Growing wheat in North Africa requires more water than growing it in Germany.
Also, different crop types have different crop water requirements and regions grow different crop
varieties. The production of a ton of rice is, for example, more water intensive than the production of a
1 Data are taken from AQUASTAT.
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tonne of wheat. Berrittella et al. (2007) use GTAP-W, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
including water resources, to analyse the economic impact of restricted water supply for water-short
regions. In contrast, this study is concerned with demand management, using a price rather than quantity
instrument to regulate water use. In economic theory, under certainty, price and quantities are their duals,
and price and quantity instruments have the same effect. However, the politics of prices and quantities are
very different. Moreover, quantity instruments are, for all practical purposes, limited to primary
production, whereas price instruments can be used at production as well as at consumption levels.
In this paper, we present the GTAP-W model and illustrate its potential application to water pricing
policies. We use arbitrary water tax scenarios, as our main concern is methodological. We aim to
demonstrate that water tax policies would generate spillover effects for economic activities and water
consumption in other industries and regions than those taxed. This analysis complements the one in
Berrittella et al. (2007), in which we use the same model for different policy simulations.
Section 2 reviews the literature on water pricing. Section 2 also shows that our approach is
complementary to what other people have done, as the price of economic comprehensiveness is a lack of
detail in production and space. Section 3 presents the model used and the data on water resources and
water use. The basic model and the corresponding data can be purchased from the Global Trade and
Analysis Project (http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). The water data can be downloaded at: http://
www.fnu.zmaw.de/GTAP-EF-W.5680.0.html. Section 4 discusses four alternative scenarios. Section 5
presents results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Previous studies
Problems in the water sector are mostly caused by the large difference between the private and the social
price of water. The difference is due to policy failures (subsidies), institutional failures (lack of well defined
and enforced land and water rights) and market failures (environmental costs that are not internalized).
A number of studies investigate the role of water price policies in order to allocate water resources more
efficiently, equitably and sustainably. They differ with respect to study area (cross-country, national,
regional) and sector analysed (residential, industry, agriculture). Some studies have looked at the
implementation and objectives of price policies in thewater sector (e.g. Dinar & Subramanian, 1998; Jones,
1998;Ahmad, 2000; Rogers et al., 2002).Other studies have analysed the economic value ofwater, the costs
of its provision and the price of its use (Rogers et al., 1998; Ward & Michelsen, 2002; Young, 2005).
In order to obtain insights from alternative water policy scenarios for the allocation of water resources,
partial and general equilibriummodels have been used. While partial equilibrium analysis focuses on the
sector affected by a policy measure, assuming that the rest of the economy is not affected, general
equilibrium models consider other sectors or regions as well, to determine the economy-wide effect.
Most of the studies using either of the two approaches analyse pricing of irrigation water only (for an
overview of this literature see Johannson et al., 2002). Rosegrant et al. (2002) use the IMPACT-Water
model to estimate demand and supply of food and water up until 2025. Fraiture et al. (2004) extend this
to include the virtual water trade, using cereals as an indicator. Their results suggest that the role of
virtual water trade is modest. While the IMPACT-Water model covers a wide range of agricultural
products and regions, other sectors are excluded; it is a partial equilibrium model.
Studies using general equilibrium approaches are generally based on data for a single country or
region assuming no effects for the rest of the world of the implemented policy. Decaluwe et al. (1999)
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analyse the effect of water pricing policies on demand and supply of water in Morocco. Daio & Roe
(2003) use an inter-temporal CGE model for Morocco focusing on water and trade policies. Seung et al.
(2000) use a dynamic CGE model to estimate the welfare gains of reallocating water from agriculture to
recreational use for the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge in Nevada. For the Arkansas River Basin,
Goodman (2000) shows that temporary water transfers are less costly than building new dams. Go´mez
et al. (2004) analyse the welfare gains from improved allocation of water rights for the Balearic Islands.
Letsoalo et al. (2007) study the effects of tax reform on water use, economic growth and income
distribution in South Africa.
Berrittella et al. (2007) are an exception, using a multi-country CGE model including water resources
(GTAP-W). They analyse the economic impact of restricted water supply for water-short regions. They
contrast a market solution, where water owners can capitalize their water rent, to a non-market solution,
where supply restrictions imply productivity losses. They show that water supply constraints could
improve allocative efficiency, as agricultural markets are heavily distorted. The welfare gain may more
than offset the welfare losses caused by the resource constraint. In contrast to Berrittella et al. (2007),
this study is concerned with demand management (rather than with changes in water supply); this paper
investigates the economic implications of water pricing policies.
3. Modeling framework and data
To assess the systemic, general equilibrium effects on water resource demand induced by different
policy scenarios, we use a multi-region world CGE model, called GTAP-W. The model is a refinement
of the GTAP model2 (Hertel, 1997) in the version modified by Burniaux & Truong (2002)3. Basically, in
the GTAP-W model, a finer industrial and regional aggregation level, respectively, 17 sectors and 16
regions, is considered. and water resources have been modelled as non-market goods4. Some
characteristics are given in (Table A1 in the Annex. The model is based on 1997 data.
As in all CGE models, the GTAP-W model makes use of the Walrasian perfect competition paradigm
to simulate adjustment processes. Industries are modelled through a representative firm, which
maximizes profits in perfectly competitive markets. The production functions are specified via a series of
nested CES functions (see Berrittella et al., 2007, for more detailed information). Domestic and foreign
inputs are not perfect substitutes, according to the so-called “Armington assumption”, which accounts
for product heterogeneity.
A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value of national
primary factors (natural resources, land, labour and capital). Capital and labour are perfectly mobile
2 The GTAP model is a standard CGE static model distributed with the GTAP database of the world economy (www.gtap.org).
For detailed information see Hertel (1997) and the technical references and papers available on the GTAP website.
3 Burniaux & Truong (2002) developed a variant of the model, called GTAP-E. The model is best suited for the analysis of
energy markets and environmental policies. There are two main changes in the basic structure. First, energy factors are
separated from the set of intermediate inputs and inserted in a nested level of substitution with capital. This allows for more
substitution possibilities. Second, database and model are extended to account for CO2 emissions related to energy
consumption.
4 The 17 sectors are rice; wheat; other cereals and crops; vegetables and fruits; animals; forestry; fishing; coal mining; oil;
natural gas extraction; refined oil products; electricity; water collection, purification and distribution services; energy intensive
industries; other industry and services; market services; non-market services.
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Table A1. Regional characteristics.
Population GDP/cap Renewable
water resource*
Water use Water intensity
in agriculture†
Water intensity
other‡
Water imports Water exports
Million US$ 109m3 per year m3/person§ 109m3 per year m3/US$ m3/US$ 109m3 109m3
USA 276 28,786 3,069 11,120 479 2.9 3.7 57 125
CAN 30 20,572 2,902 96,733 46 4.3 5.2 8 51
WEU 388 24,433 2,227 5,740 227 2.6 3.5 256 96
JPK 172 35,603 500 2,907 107 1.4 1.6 82 0
ANZ 22 21,052 819 37,227 26 4.1 1.2 3 30
CEE 121 2,996 494 4,083 60 3.3 13.6 19 6
FSU 291 1,556 4,730 16,254 284 9.1 28.0 27 61
MDE 227 3,150 483 2,128 206 4.9 6.8 35 19
CAM 128 2,938 1,183 9,242 101 5.2 13.6 25 31
LAM 332 4,830 12,246 36,886 164 3.9 5.9 35 68
SAS 1289 416 3,685 2,859 918 9.8 47.5 21 25
SEA 638 4,592 5,266 8,254 279 10.1 12.8 58 35
CHI 1,274 790 2,897 2,274 630 3.6 38.5 33 16
NAF 135 1,284 107 793 95 8.5 39.5 27 4
SSA 605 563 4,175 6,901 113 11.4 6.4 14 132
ROW 42 3,338 2,984 71,048 75 4.7 2.7 6 8
* 2001 estimates taken from Aquastat.
† Average water intensity covering crop/plant growth and animal production measured in water use/US$ output. Numbers differ considerably between
countries and sectors. Note that water use includes the use of different kinds of sources; rain, soil moisture and irrigation water. However, farmers pay for
irrigation water only.
‡ Note that in some countries only a low number of persons is connected to a distribution network. In others a number of self-supplied industries are not
connected. However, both are included as users of the services that the water distribution network provides. As a consequence, water use per US$ of output is
overstated in the above table.
§ UN criterion for water resource scarcity degree: slightly scarce (1,700–3,000), middle scarce (1,000–1,700), severe scarcity (500–1,000) and most severe
scarcity (,500).
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domestically, but immobile internationally. Land (imperfectly mobile) and natural resources are
industry specific. The national income is allocated between aggregate household consumption, public
consumption and savings (see Berrittella et al., 2007, for more detailed information). The expenditure
shares are generally fixed, which amounts to saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb–
Douglas specification. Private consumption is split in a series of alternative composite Armington
aggregates. The functional specification used at this level is the constant difference in elasticities (CDE)
form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for possible differences in income elasticities
for the various consumption goods. A money metric measure of economic welfare, the equivalent
variation can be computed from the model output.
In the GTAP model and its variants, two industries are treated in a special way and are not related to
any region. International transport is a world industry, which produces the transportation services
associated with the movement of goods between origin and destination regions, thereby determining the
cost margin between free on board (f.o.b.) and cost insurance and freight (c.i.f.) prices. Transport
services are produced by means of factors submitted by all countries, in variable proportions. In a similar
way, a hypothetical world bank collects savings from all regions and allocates investments so as to
achieve equality of expected future rates of return.
In our modelling framework, water is combined with the value-added-energy nest and the
intermediate inputs (see Berrittella et al., 2007, for more detailed information). As in the original GTAP
model, there is no substitutability between intermediate inputs and value-added for the production
function of tradable goods and services. In the benchmark equilibrium, water supply is supposed to be
unconstrained, so that water demand is lower or equal to water supply and the price for water is zero.
Water is supplied to the agricultural industry, which includes primary crop production and livestock and
to the water distribution services sector, which delivers water to the rest of the economic sectors5.
The key parameter for the determination of regional water use is the water intensity coefficient. This is
defined as the amount of water necessary for sector j to produce one unit of commodity6. To estimate
water intensity coefficients, we first calculated total water use by commodity and country for the year
1997. For the agricultural sector the FAOSTAT database provided information about the production of
primary crops and livestock. This includes detailed information on different crop types and animal
categories. Information on water requirements for crop growth and animal feeding was taken from
Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004)7. The water requirement includes both the use of blue water (ground and
surface water) as well as green water (moisture stored in soil strata). For crops it is defined as the sum of
water needed for evapotranspiration, from planting to harvest and depends on crop type and region. This
procedure assumes that water is not in short supply and no water is lost by irrigation inefficiencies. For
animals, the virtual water content is mainly the sum of water needed for feeding and drinking. The water
intensity parameter for the water distribution sector is based on the country’s industrial and domestic
water use data provided by AQUASTAT8.
5 Note that distributed water can have a price, even if primary water resources are in excess supply.
6 This refers to water directly used in the production process, not to the water indirectly needed to produce other input factors.
7 This information is provided as an average over the period from 1997 to 2001. By making use of this data we assume that
water requirements are constant at least in the short term.
8 This information is based on data for 2000. By making use of this data we assume that domestic and industrial water uses in
2000 are the same as in 1997.
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We make the link between output levels and water demand sensitive to water prices, by assuming that
more expensive water brings about rationalization in usage and substitution with other factors. The
actual capability to reduce the relative intensity of water demand is industry specific and captured by an
industrial water price elasticity parameter (Table 1).
4. Scenarios
We run four alternative simulation exercises, each dealing with the economic impact of water pricing
policies.
In the base scenario (scenario 1), we impose a water charge of US$10m per 109 m3 of water for
all users. This is equivalent to a price increase of ¢1 per cubic metre of water. The aim of this
scenario is to test how much water saving can be achieved and at what economic cost.
As a first sensitivity analysis, in the second scenario (scenario 2), we lower the price to ¢0.5/m3.
The value of water differs not only between countries but also between the various sectors. Prices
for agricultural water use are generally lower compared to domestic water use; most expensive is
industrial water use (see e.g. Dinar & Subramanian, 1998; Ahmad, 2000). Variable costs for
agricultural water use, for example, range between zero and US$0.39 per m3. Compared with these
numbers, our water taxes are small. There are two reasons for this. First, farmers grow crops with
three different sources of water; rain, soil moisture and irrigation water. However, they only pay
for irrigation water. The average price for all three uses is, therefore, small. We do not differentiate
between water sources because of data limitations. Second, industrial water use is defined as the
water use by self-supplied industries, not connected to any distribution network. “Domestic” water
use is computed as the total amount of water supplied by public distribution networks and usually
includes the withdrawal by industries connected to public networks. However, in the model,
Table 1. Water price elasticities.
Country region Agricultural sectors Water distribution services
USA United States 20.14 20.72
CAN Canada 20.08 20.53
WEU Western Europe 20.04 20.45
JPK Japan and Korea 20.06 20.45
ANZ Australia and New Zealand 20.11 20.67
EEU Eastern Europe 20.06 20.44
FSU Former Soviet Union 20.09 20.67
MDE Middle East 20.11 20.77
CAM Central America 20.08 20.53
SAM South America 20.12 20.80
SAS South Asia 20.11 20.75
SEA Southeast Asia 20.12 20.80
CHI China 20.16 20.80
NAF North Africa 20.07 20.60
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 20.15 20.80
ROW Rest of the world 20.20 20.85
Source: Our elaboration from Rosegrant et al. (2003).Q1
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all industrial and domestic water use, connected to a public network or not, is included as
customers of the water distribution network.
Scenario 3 is a variant of scenario 1. Water taxes are introduced in water-short regions only, viz.
North Africa (NAF), South Asia (SAS), the United States (USA) and China (CHI). These regions
use more groundwater than is recharged (cf. Berrittella et al., 2007).
In scenarios 1–3, water is taxed when used in production. In scenario 4, final consumption is taxed,
proportional to the water used in the production of the consumption goods. We apply a water charge of
US$10m per 109m3 of water.
In all scenarios, the revenue from the water tax is redistributed in a lump sum to the representative
household.
5. Simulation results
Results for all scenarios described in Section 4 are presented in Tables 2–5, reporting water demand,
virtual water trade balance, GDP, trade balance and welfare. The virtual water trade balance reports,
similar to the trade balance, the difference between a region’s exports and its imports measured in
water quantities.
In scenario 1, reported in Table 2, we simulate a water tax of US$10m per 109 m3 for water. The
increase in water prices leads to a decrease in water demand in all regions, except in Western Europe.
This region has a low-water intensity and shows little sensitivity to changes in prices for water.
Consequently, although water prices increase, agricultural production is raised and water-intensive
products are exported to other regions. The virtual water trade balance is positive for Western Europe.
North Africa exhibits the highest reduction in water demand. This is because the water intensity of this
Table 2. Scenario 1: Uniform change in the regional water rent (US$10m per 109 m3 of water).
Water demand
(%)
Virtual water trade balance
(change in 109m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade balance
(change in million US$)
EV welfare
(change in million US$)
USA 21.45 4.31 20.003 24719 1766
CAN 23.69 21.99 0.016 272 449
WEU 0.45 24.78 0.011 24863 1135
JPK 20.19 4.97 0.001 23961 816
ANZ 21.23 20.47 0.008 2197 394
EEU 23.54 2.27 20.028 663 2280
FSU 212.20 26.85 20.024 1092 2712
MDE 26.63 20.89 20.024 1913 21448
CAM 24.10 21.78 0.012 57 102
SAM 20.62 4.02 0.004 93 583
SAS 25.25 25.01 20.069 2644 2842
SEA 22.73 3.49 20.029 1862 2781
CHI 27.58 2.37 20.011 2006 2365
NAF 219.25 23.72 20.119 1097 21123
SSA 26.85 225.58 20.115 2278 2428
ROW 21.73 0.07 20.004 106 2112
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region is high. The water tax leads to a net increase in virtual water imports in regions that are relatively
water intensive, such as North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. These are also the regions
with limited water resource availability. Water-short countries partly meet their demand for water-
intensive products by importing them. Global welfare falls owing to the increase in water prices and the
restriction of a scarce resource. However, welfare losses are not universal; some regions gain as their
competitive position improves, such as the USA and Western Europe.
Table 3. Scenario 2: Uniform change in the regional water rent (US$5m per 109 m3 of water).
Water demand
(%)
Virtual water trade balance
(change in 109m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade balance
(change in million US$)
EV welfare
(change in million US$)
USA 20.76 1.97 20.001 22247 830
CAN 21.84 20.97 0.009 229 222
WEU 0.19 12.29 0.005 22278 477
JPK 20.10 2.53 0.000 21873 372
ANZ 20.72 20.30 0.004 293 187
EEU 21.86 1.12 20.013 330 2139
FSU 26.50 23.40 20.007 522 2307
MDE 23.33 20.44 20.008 911 2661
CAM 22.04 20.86 0.008 26 63
SAM 20.34 1.89 0.002 62 266
SAS 22.75 22.33 20.020 1235 2320
SEA 21.35 1.69 20.012 874 2355
CHI 24.31 1.16 20.004 995 2173
NAF 28.90 21.54 20.013 474 2407
SSA 23.35 212.86 20.040 1039 2127
ROW 20.86 0.03 20.002 53 253
Table 4. Scenario 3: Uniform change in regional water rent for water short countries (US$10m per 109m3).
Water demand
(%)
Virtual water trade balance
(change in 109m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade balance
(change in million US$)
EV welfare
(change in million US$)
USA 22.56 26.22 0.002 2518 782
CAN 1.87 2.54 20.001 2179 101
WEU 0.61 5.12 0.003 22817 780
JPK 0.19 0.57 20.005 21567 266
ANZ 4.76 3.36 0.003 2125 152
EEU 0.24 0.30 0.005 2141 35
FSU 0.49 1.22 20.001 2166 238
MDE 0.95 1.27 20.011 2203 2261
CAM 0.74 1.38 20.009 230 258
SAM 0.54 2.89 0.008 2499 320
SAS 25.62 29.68 20.069 2831 2951
SEA 0.15 1.51 20.003 26 2117
CHI 28.04 21.72 20.001 2360 2416
NAF 221.09 28.10 20.099 1222 2818
SSA 0.69 5.15 0.010 2101 132
ROW 0.19 0.42 0.002 261 12
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Applying the water tax only to agricultural sectors (results not shown), total water demand is higher
than in the first scenario, because there is no change in the water charge for the water distribution
services sector. The more water-intensive are the agricultural sectors, the higher is the deficit in terms of
virtual water trade balance. Overall, taxing agricultural water use only is a reasonably effective policy.
It deviates from the optimum of taxing all water use, but the welfare loss is limited.
The scenario results depend to some extent on water price elasticity (results not shown). If there is no
flexibility in water intensity at the level of farms and water distribution companies, countries cannot
improve their water efficiency in domestic production. The global water demand is higher (decreases
less) than in scenario 1. On the regional level the change in demand differs; demand decreases less,
increases rather than decreases, or increases more depending on the regions’ water price elasticity as
well as the water-intensity coefficient. Global welfare decreases more, because the resource constraint is
more stringent. Although the regional pattern is the same as in scenario 1, regions with higher price
elasticities suffer more if they cannot improve their water efficiency in domestic production.
Table 3 reports the simulation results of scenario 2, where water is taxed at US$5m per 109 m3. As
expected, water demand falls, but less so than in scenario 1. Comparing the two sets of results, the
reduction in water demand is slightly less than linear for the water tax. Water price increase is half
the amount of scenario 1, but water demand decreases more than 50% for most regions. Welfare falls in
the more water-intensive countries, such as North Africa and the Middle East, but less so than in scenario
1. The opposite occurs for more water efficient regions, such as Western Europe and the USA. At world
level, welfare falls, but a factor 7 less so than in scenario 1 (2US$125m compared to 2US$846m).
In scenario 3, we increase the water charges only for water-short regions, viz. North Africa, China, the
USA and South Asia (see Table 4). The water demand decreases in these four regions, more so in the less
water efficient ones, such as North Africa. In terms of the virtual water trade, as expected, an increase in
the water price leads to an increase in virtual water imports in the constrained regions and to a decrease
Table 5. Scenario 4: Water taxation on consumption (US$10m per 109m3 of water).
Water demand
(%)
Virtual water trade balance
(change in 109 m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade balance
(change in million US$)
EV welfare
(change in million US$)
USA 22.10 22.19 0.000 23919 671
CAN 23.08 21.54 0.007 44 29
WEU 20.83 23.81 0.015 24609 2629
JPK 20.53 20.13 0.009 24354 1998
ANZ 22.67 21.36 20.001 246 296
EEU 23.37 20.15 20.017 431 2105
FSU 27.44 0.01 20.015 1182 2537
MDE 21.72 0.39 20.032 1584 21092
CAM 21.96 0.00 0.000 173 290
SAM 21.32 20.81 20.009 357 2392
SAS 23.76 2.40 20.067 2602 2755
SEA 22.02 1.77 20.031 1963 2453
CHI 26.29 20.15 20.004 1585 2201
NAF 23.16 0.59 20.015 555 2253
SSA 23.12 4.99 20.079 2317 21049
ROW 21.50 0.01 20.005 136 2118
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in virtual water exports. On the other hand, a deficit in terms of virtual water trade is not always
accompanied by a negative variation in the trade balance. For example, in North Africa, South Asia and
China, the trade balance improves. The USA, South Asia and China lose in terms of welfare, relative to
scenario 1. On the other hand, North Africa gains because the increase in the imports of water-intensive
goods is less expensive than in scenario 1. Global welfare decreases in scenario 3, but less so than in
scenario 1, as water prices increase in some regions only. Increasing water charges in four regions
reduces the world welfare by half the amount an increase in water rent for all 16 regions would lead to.
Furthermore, excluding the USA from the list of water-restricted countries affects water savings only
slightly (from 2.7–2.6%), but reduces the world welfare loss substantially, from a welfare loss of
US$413m to a welfare loss of US$281m (results not shown).
In scenario 4, final consumption of water-intensive commodities and services is taxed instead of
taxating factor inputs. Taxing water in this way leads to a decrease in the demand for water in all regions.
In this scenario, the reductions in water resource uses are more uniform amongst regions than in scenario
1 and global water demand changes less. Furthermore, changes in virtual water trade are substantially
lower. Unlike in any other scenario, global welfare increases. Particularly, Western Europe, Japan and
South Korea gain more, while the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa are the main losers. However,
compared to scenario 1, welfare changes are generally less negative in many regions. The more a region
imports water-intensive commodities, the more that region gains compared to the first scenario. This
shows that it matters how the costs of water resources use are internalized, as this determines the options
for substituting away from water, as well as the distribution of the burden.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we present a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy with water as
an explicit factor of production. We use the model to test water taxes under different scenarios. In the
base scenario, we simulate a water charge of US$10m per 109 m3 of water. As expected, the water
demand decreases in many regions, but some regions find it profitable to raise the production of water-
intensive commodities in order to export them. The world as a whole is worse off, although some
countries gain as their competitive position improves. Water demand falls are less than linear in the
water tax; welfare losses are more than linear in the water tax. The impact of a water tax is more
pronounced if it is harder to improve water efficiency. Furthermore, any water price policy should take
into account who and what is taxed. Water taxes in agriculture drive most of the effects and virtually all
of the trade effects. A tax in water-scarce regions only would lead to a shift in agricultural trade and an
increase in water demand elsewhere. A water tax in some countries, particularly the USA, contributes
little to water savings but substantially to welfare losses. There is a clear trade-off between water savings
and welfare change. A tax on the final consumption of water rather than on the use of water in production
would be less effective in reducing water use, but would be less costly; while the distributional and trade
effects are very different.
For some world regions, the water supply is already critical. Rapid population growth and increasing
consumption per capita has further aggregated the problem. An additional reason for concern is climate
change. Today, most problems in the water sector are caused by large differences between the private
and the social price of water. Although an optimal policy would include all water-using sectors, a water
tax on agriculture, the main water user, has a significant impact on water savings already. Such a policy
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would considerably reduce the gap between the private and the social cost of water. For water-short
countries, it would be beneficial if water is not taxed abroad. Water taxes in water-rich countries would
further increase market prices for agricultural goods and raise the price of imported water-intensive
products. To limit the negative impact of rising world market prices for water-intensive products, a water
tax should be accompanied by policies promoting the substitutes for water-intensive products, improved
irrigation, limiting water leakage and improved efficiency. Another important issue is the crop mix.
A different mix with less water-demanding crops, which are perhaps also more adapted to heat, might
reduce water demand further. Trade liberalization might help as well, as it stimulates substitution.
The analysis establishes two things. First, domestic policies to conserve water, here implemented by a
water tax, have ramifications for international trade. As a result, national water policies are interconnected
and should, at the least, not be set in ignorance of other countries’ water policies. Second, the effects of
water policy on national economies and international trade can gainfully be studied with a computable
general equilibriummodel. The data used in this paper to extend theGTAP-CGE, are in the public domain.
This analysis needs to be extended in several ways and a number of limitations apply. First, we have not
been able to allocate industrial water use to its different users. We rather used a simplifying assumption
that water for domestic and industry use is supplied by the water service sector. Second, we consider
regional water supply, implicitly assuming that there is a perfect water market and costless water transport
within each region. Sector-specific water resources allow for sub-regional differentiation of water
resources, but only to a limited extent. Third, we were not able to differentiate between the different
qualities of water supplied. Some, but not all, of the difference is captured by defining sector-specific
water. Fourth, in our model we assume that water is used efficiently and no water is wasted. The water
intensity coefficient captures some differences, but these differences do not respond to price or other
signals, except to the price ofwater. Fifth, for the agricultural sector, we used irrigationwater plus rainfall,
without distinction; water use is gross water use, ignoring evapotranspiration by crops. Sixth, we nested
water at the upper level in the production function of the water intensive goods and services, so that water
cannot be substituted by specific inputs in the production processes. Seventh, we used a single data set for
water use andwater resources, ignoring the uncertainties in the data. All this is deferred to future research.
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